In this paper, we introduce the concept of dual universality of hash functions and present its applications to various quantum and classical communication models including cryptography. We begin by establishing the one-to-one correspondence between a linear function family F and a code family C, and thereby defining ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions, as a generalization of the conventional universal2 hash functions. Then we give a security proof for the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol, where the Shor-Preskill-type argument is used, but nevertheless ε-almost dual universal2 functions can be used for privacy amplification. We show that a similar result applies to the quantum wire-tap channel as well.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of universal hash functions [4] has a variety of cryptographic applications, for example, for the information theoretically secure signatures, the hash functions for the wire-tap channel and for privacy amplification [28] . In this paper, we introduce the concept of ε-almost dual universal hash functions and present its applications to various quantum and classical communication models including cryptography. The first application is to a security proof for quantum key distribution (QKD) and the quantum-wiretap channel. Next we apply our results on these quantum models for investigating the classical wire-tap channel and randomness extraction, and obtain various new results, such as the existence of a deterministic hash function that is universally secure against different types of wire-tapper. For proving these results, we present an extremely simple argument by simulating the classical channels by quantum channels, where the strength of Eve's wire-tapping can be measured by the phase bit error rate. These examples suggest the importance of quantum approaches in classical settings of information theory, as well as the dual universality of hash functions.
We begin in Section II by reviewing the conventional universal hash functions, i.e., the properties of ε-almost universal 2 functions. Then we restrict ourselves to linear hash functions over a finite field F n 2 , and establish a one-to-one correspondence between a linear hash function family F and a linear code family C, by using the simple fact that a kernel of a linear function is a linear space, and thus can be considered as a code. This correspondence does not only allow us to define the code family C of a given universal hash function family F , but also the dual code family C ⊥ corresponding to it. Under this setting, interestingly, a simple algebraic argument shows that the universality of C (i.e., the property of C being universal 2 ) also guarantees that of C ⊥ (see Fig. I ). For example, (1) if C is universal 2 , or equivalently, 1-almost universal 2 , then C ⊥ is 2-almost universal 2 , but nevertheless, (2) for an ε-almost universal 2 code family C with ε > 1, the dual code family C is not necessarily ε-almost universal 2 , as can be seen from an explicit counterexample. These results lead us to introduce a new class of hash functions called an ε-almost dual universal 2 hash function family, as a set of hash functions whose kernels form an ε-almost dual universal 2 code family. This concept is indeed a generalization of the conventional universality 2 , since a universal 2 hash function family is a special case of our ε-almost dual universal 2 family. As we shall show in subsequent sections, this weaker notion of universality has applications in many communication models.
In Section III, we also introduce the concept of the permuted code family, as the set of codes obtained by permuting bits of a given code C. Then we show the existence of a code C, whose permuted family C C is (n + 1)-almost dual universal 2 , with n being the bit length of C. The code C of this type is particularly useful when the setting of our communication model is invariant under bit permutations, since the average performance of the code C equals that of an (n + 1)-almost dual universal 2 code family. Due to this property, the permuted code family plays a key role in showing the existence of a deterministic hash function that works universally for different types of channels.
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In Section IV, as a preparation for later sections, we apply the results of Sections 2 and 3 to error correction. We show that a code C ∈ C serves as a good code when it is chosen randomly from an ε-almost universal 2 code family C.
In Section V, we apply these results to the security proof of a QKD protocol called the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [1] . We use the proof technique of the Shor-Preskill-type, which reduces the security of a secret key to the error correcting property of the Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) quantum error correcting code (e.g., [26] , [10] , [29] , [14] ). This proof technique is elegant and widely used, but also has a drawback. That is, it requires the implementation of the classical CSS code in actual QKD systems, which can be difficult especially for large block lengths. On the other hand, by using the quantum de Finneti representation theorem, Renner [25] has shown the security of the BB84 protocol using universal 2 hash functions for privacy amplification, which can be implemented easily in practice (see, e.g., [9] ). The security proof of the present paper combines the best of both worlds; that is, it is based on the Shor-Preskill formalism, but it nevertheless allows to use ε-almost dual universal 2 function. Note that the restriction on hash functions is relaxed here, since, as mentioned earlier, the conventional universal 2 function family is a limited case of ε-almost dual universal 2 families.
Then, in Section VI and VII, we apply our results on QKD to the quantum and classical wiretap channels. In these model, a sender Alice has channels to two receivers, i.e., an authorized receiver Bob, and an unauthorized receiver Eve, often referred to as a wire-tapper. The channels from Alice to Bob and to Eve are not necessarily restricted to any type, but we assume that they are both specified when we analyze the security. The main issue here is to obtain the asymptotic secure transmission rate with appropriate coding protocols. The net transmission rate can be given as the information transmission rate R ′ to Bob minus the sacrifice bit rate R. The former rate can be treated in the framework of error correcting code. The latter rate corresponds to a privacy amplification process.
Under these settings, in Section VI, we consider a specific type of the quantum wire-tap channel where Alice and Bob are connected by the Pauli channnel. By applying our results on QKD to this model, we show that an ε-almost dual universal 2 function family is sufficient for removing Eve's information. Then by using the invariance of the channel under bit permutations, we also show the existence of a deterministic hash function that works universally, that is, the hash function whose construction does not depend on the phase error probability caused by the wiretapper.
Next, in Section VII, we consider the classical wire-tap channel model, where all channels are classical. Here we only assume that the channel from Alice to Bob is binary, and besides that, all channels are general; i.e., they are not restricted to any form, unlike the Pauli channel of the previous section. In these channels, Alice and Bob use an ε-almost dual universal 2 function family for privacy amplification. In order to analyze the security of this model, we simulate the classical channel by using a quantum channels, where the strength of Eve's wire-tapping is reflected in the phase bit error rate. Applying the idea of quantum error correcting code, we show the strong security for the case where the input alphabets is {0, 1}. As shown in Section II, the class of ε-almost dual universal 2 functions is wider than that of universal 2 functions. We also give a counterexample for the strong security under the ε-almost universality 2 for privacy amplification. This example tells us that the ε-almost dual universality 2 is more relevant for strong security than the ε-almost universality 2 (c.f., Fig. I ). Then using the result of Section III, we construct a deterministic hash function that is universally secure regardless of the form of Eve's channel. This example suggests the importance of quantum approaches in the classical setting, as well as the dual universality of hash functions. Finally in Section VIII, we show that the above result on wire-tap channels can be used to analyze the performance of randomness extraction. Again by noting the invariance under bit permutations, we can construct a deterministic hash function that works universally even when the original random source is an arbitrary binary distribution with probability p. It should also be noted that the asymptotic generation rate of our extractor is larger than the minimum entropy achieved in the conventional method [18] .
II. DUAL UNIVERSALITY OF A CODE FAMILY

A. Linear universal hash functions as a linear code family
We start by reviewing the basic properties of universal 2 hash functions. Consider sets A and B, and also a function family F consisting of functions from A to B; that is, F is a set of function F = {f r |r ∈ I} with f r : A → B, where I denotes a set of indices r of hash functions. Our purpose is to select f r with an equal probability and use them as a hash function, and for this purpose, we always let |A| ≥ |B| ≥ 2. We say that a function family F is ε-almost universal 2 [4] , [31] , if, for any pair of different inputs x 1 ,x 2 , the collision probability of their outputs is upper bounded as
The parameter ε appearing in (1) is shown to be confined in the region
and in particular, a function family F attaining the equality of (2) is called an optimally universal 2 function family [27] . On the other hand, a family F with ε = 1 is simply called a universal 2 function family. Two important examples of universal 2 hash function families are the Toeplitz matrices (see, e.g., [20] ), and multiplications over a finite field (see, e.g., [4] , [2] ). A modified form of the Toeplitz matrices is also shown to be universal 2 , which is given by a concatenation (X, I) of the Toeplitz matrix X and the identity matrix I [16] . The (modified) Toeplitz matrices are particularly useful in practice, because there exists an efficient multiplication algorithm using the fast Fourier transform algorithm with complexity O(n log n) (see, e.g., [9] ).
In this paper, we focus only on linear functions over a finite field F 2 . We assume that sets A,B are F n 2 , F m 2 respectively with n ≥ m, and f r are linear functions over F 2 . Note that, in this case, there is a kernel C r corresponding to each f r , which is a vector space of n − m dimensions or more. Also note that, conversely, when given a vector subspace C r ⊂ F n 2 of n − m dimensions or more, one can always construct a linear functioñ
This means that, by considering C r as a error-correcting code 1 , we can always identify a linear hash function f r and a error correcting code C r .
In this terminology, the definition of ε-universal 2 function family of (1) takes the form
which can further be rewritten as
This shows that the set of kernel C = {C r |r ∈ I} contains sufficient information for determining if a function family F = {f r |r ∈ I} is ε-almost universal 2 or not. To see this in more detail, we give explicit constructions. For later convenience, we denote a generating matrix of a code C by G(C), so that the raws of G(C) are basis vectors of C. We also denote a parity check matrix of C by H(C), hence one may choose H(C) = G(C ⊥ ). If one wants to construct C r from f r , let x be a column vector, and define a linear function f r as y = f r (x) = M r x by using an m × n-matrix M r . Here M r corresponds to a parity check matrix of error-correcting code C r , and thus the row vectors of M r spans C It should be noted that, in fact, this construction off r has an ambiguity that comes from choices of bases {u i } and {v i }. By the above procedure, even when one constructs C r from f r , and thenf r from the obtained C r ,f r and f r may not equal in general. In this paper, however, we do not worry about this ambiguity, because (i) the ambiguity does not affect the property of f r being ε-almost universal 2 , and (ii) the ambiguity is absent after all when we actually implement and operate universal hash functions for cryptographic purposes; in such cases, we never think of C r as a vector space, but rather specify matrices M r or basis sets of C r explicitly. Note that a similar situation happens with error-correcting codes as well; i.e., it is convenient to interpret C r as a mathematical vector space when one analyzes the code theoretically, but in practice one can never implement a code as a program or a circuit without specifying the basis vectors, or equivalently, the parity check and the generating matrices.
B. Dual universality of a code family
From these arguments, we define the universality of error-correcting codes as follows. Definition 1: We define the minimum (respectively, maximum) dimension of a code family C = {C r |r ∈ I} as t min := min r∈I dim C r (respectively, t max := max r∈I dim C r ).
Definition 2: We define the dual code family C ⊥ of a given linear code family C = {C r |r ∈ I} as the set of all dual codes of C r . That is, C ⊥ = {C ⊥ r |r ∈ I}. Definition 3: We say that a linear code family C = { C r ⊂ F n 2 | r ∈ I } of minimum (or maximum) dimension t is an ε-almost universal 2 code family, if the following condition is satisfied
As in the case of a universal 2 function family, ε is bounded from below by (2) as ε ≥ (2 n − 2 n−t )/(2 n − 1). For the case where ε achieves this minimum, we say that C is optimally universal 2 . Similarly, if ε = 1, we call C a universal 2 code family.
We also introduce the notion of dual universality as follows.
Definition 4:
We say that a code family C is ε-almost dual universal 2 , if the dual family C ⊥ is ε-almost universal 2 . Hence, accordingly, Definition 5: A linear function family F = {f r |r ∈ I} is ε-almost dual universal 2 , if the kernels C r of f r form an ε-almost dual universal 2 code family. An explicit example of a dual universal 2 function family (with ε = 1) can be given by the modified Toeplitz matrices mentioned earlier [14] , i.e., a concatenation (X, I) of the Toeplitz matrix X and the identity matrix I. This example is particularly useful in practice because it is both universal 2 and dual universal 2 (c.f., Fig. I ), and also because there exists an efficient algorithm with complexity O(n log n).
With these preliminaries, we can present the following main theorem of this section: Theorem 1: Given an ε-almost universal 2 code family C of minimum dimension t, the dual code family C ⊥ is a 2(1 − 2 t−n ε) + (ε − 1)2 t -almost universal 2 code family with maximum dimension n − t. That is, for ∀x ∈ F n 2 \ {0}, the dual code family
In other words, the code family C is also
where (x, y) denotes the inner product of x, y. Since #(V x \ {0}) = 2 n−1 − 1,
Now, (i) If x ∈ C ⊥ r , it means that C r ⊂ V x , and we have dim(C r ∩V x ) = dim C r ≥ t. Hence it follows that #(C r ∩V x \{0}) = #(C r \ {0}) ≥ 2 t − 1. On the other hand, (ii) If x / ∈ C ⊥ r , we have dim(C r ∩V x ) ≥ t− 1, and thus #(C r ∩V x \ {0}) ≥ 2 t−1 − 1. Because y∈Vx\{0} Pr [y ∈ C r ] is equal to the average of the number of #(C r ∩ V x \ {0}), relations (i) and (ii) yields
Combining (10) and (11), we have 2 t−n (2 n−1 − 1)ε ≥ 2 t−1 + p x 2 t−1 − 1, which leads to inequality (7). Theorem 2: Inequality (7) of Theorem 1 is tight. That is, for an integer t ≤ n, an element x ∈ F n 2 \ {0}, and a positive real number ε ≤ 2−2 1−t 1−2 1−n , there exists an ε-almost universal 2 code family C with minimum dimension t satisfying the equality of (7).
In the above theorem, the real number ε = 2−2
Then define a code family A = {A r } in F n 2 as follows. Choose randomly an t-dimensional subspace of V x = {y ∈ F n 2 |(x, y) = 0}. That is, select t linearly independent elements from V x randomly, and let them span a subspace A r . Then one has:
We also define another code family B = {B r } as follows. First choose an t − 1-dimensional subspace of V x randomly, and then include an additional basis element z ∈ V x to it, so that they form an t-dimensional subspace in total. Then the following inequalities hold:
Finally, define a code family C = {C r } by combining A with probability p, and B with probability 1 − p, where p is defined by
One may wonder that this construction using probability p deviates from our definition of universal 2 code family that each element C r is chosen with the uniform probability. One way to cure this problem is to include multiple copies of A and B in C. For example, if p = a/b with a, b ∈ N, then construct C as a combination of a copies of A and b − a copies of B.
From (12), (13) , and (14), it is straightforward to see that C is ε-almost universal 2 . Also note, since x ∈ C ⊥ r holds only when A is chosen, we have
Hence, C indeed attains the equality of (7). We give some useful examples of Theorems 1 and 2. We apply these results to several communication models in later sections.
Corollary 1: The following relations hold for a code family C and the dual family C ⊥ :
1) If C is optimally universal 2 , C ⊥ is also optimally universal 2 . In other words, an optimally universal 2 family C is also optimally dual universal 2 .
2) If C is universal 2 (i.e., 1-almost universal 2 ), C ⊥ is 2-almost universal 2 . In other words, a universal 2 family C is also 2-almost dual universal 2 .
3) For ε > 1, however, an ε-almost universal 2 family C is not necessarily ε ′ -almost dual universal 2 . That is, there is an example of an ε-almost universal 2 family C with max x Pr[x ∈ C ⊥ r ] = 1. Proof: Items 1 and 2 are obvious. For item 3, choose ε so that the right hand side of (7) equals 1.
C. Generalization to subcode and extended code families
For the application to quantum key distribution, it is convenient to generalize the concept of a universal 2 code family to those C = {C 2r } consisting solely of extended codes of C 1 .
Definition 6:
where [x] denotes the coset with the representative x in F n 2 /C 1 . By considering a universality of a dual code family of such extended code family, we are naturally led to the following definition of universal 2 subcode families.
One explicit construction of C 2 is to first let D = {D r ∈ F m 2 |r ∈ I} be a universal 2 code family with minimum dimension t, and then define generating matrix of
. For these types of codes as well, we can prove a theorem similar to Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 3: Let C 1 ⊂ F n 2 be a fixed m-dimensional code, and C 2 be an ε-almost universal 2 subcode family
In other words, the subcode family C 2 is also a 2(1 − 2 t−m ε) + (ε − 1)2 t -almost dual universal 2 extended code family of C 1 . Moreover, for an integer t ≤ m, an element x ∈ F 2 \ C ⊥ 1 , and a positive real number ε ≤ 2−2 1−t 1−2 1−m , there exists an ε-almost universal 2 subcode family C 2 of C 1 with minimum dimension t satisfying the equality of (17) .
Proof: For an ε-almost universal 2 subcode (extended code) family C 2 of C 1 , the equivalence relations
hold. The proofs of the above theorems with F m 2 can be applied to this theorem. Theorem 4: Let C 1 ⊂ F n 2 be a fixed m-dimensional code, and C 2 be an ε-almost universal 2 extended code family C 2 of C 1 with minimum dimension t ≥ m. Then the dual code family C
In other words, the extended code family C 2 is also a
Furthermore, for an integer m ≤ t ≤ n, an element x ∈ C ⊥ 1 \ {0}, and a positive real number ε ≤ 2−2 1−t+m 1−2 1−n+m , there exists an ε-almost universal 2 extended code family C 2 of C 1 with minimum dimension t satisfying the equality of (18) .
Proof: Similarly, for an ε-almost universal 2 extended code family C 2 of C 1 , the equivalence relations
hold. Under this equivalence, C 2r /C 1 can be regarded as subspace of F n−m 2 with the minimum dimension t − m. The proofs of the above theorems with F n−m 2 and the minimum dimension t − m can be applied to this theorem. Furthermore, the concept of a subcode family and an extended code family can be extended to the case where C 1 is also randomly chosen. A family of a pair of codes {C 1,r ⊂ C 2,r } r is called an ε-almost universal 2 extended code pair family with minimum (or maximum) dimension t when it satisfies the condition
III. PERMUTED CODE FAMILY In some applications, our setting is invariant under permutations of the order of bits in F n 2 . For example, in wire-tap channels which we consider in later sections, independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) channels are assumed and thus the protocol is invariant under permutations of bits. Then a code C ⊂ F n 2 has the same performance as any bit-permuted code of C. In order to formulate such situations, we introduce the permuted code family of a code C as a code ensemble consisting of bit-permuted codes of C
Here S n denotes the symmetric group of degree n, and σ(i) = j means that σ ∈ S n maps i to j, where i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The code σ(C) is the one obtained by permuting bits of C by a permutation σ;
In what follows, we denote the distribution of the Hamming weight k of codewords in C by P r C ; that is, the number of codewords with weight k contained in C is |C|P r C (k). Similarly, the weight distribution P r C of a code family C is obtained by averaging P r C over C ∈ C with an equal probability. By using these concepts, we can show the existence of a fixed code C, whose permuted code family C C is ε-almost universal 2 , with ε being sufficiently small.
Lemma 1: The permuted code family C C is ε(C)-almost universal 2 code family, where
and t is the dimension of the code C. Proof: Any code C ′ ∈ C C has an identical weight distribution P r C . By averaging them over all C ′ ∈ C C , we see that code family C also has the weight distribution P r C . That is, a code C ′ ∈ C C contains 2 t P r C (k) elements of weight k on average. On the other hand, the number of elements x ∈ F n 2 with weight k is n k , and due to the symmetry of C C under bit permutations, each of them is contained in some C ′ ∈ C C with the same probability. Thus, an element x ∈ F n 2 with weight k belongs to the code C ′ ∈ C C with the probability
. By taking the maximum with respect to k, we obtain (20).
Theorem 5: For any t ≤ n, there exists a t-dimensional code C ∈ F n 2 such that ε(C) ≤ n + 1. Proof: Let C be a universal 2 code family. Then, Eε k (C) ≤ 1. The Markov inequality yields
and thus
Hence, there exists a code C such that
for k = 1, . . . , n. Similarly, we can define the permuted extended code pair family for a given pair of codes C 2 ⊂ C 1 as the family of code pairs
. Using the same discussion as the proof of Theorem 5, we can show that the permuted code pair family C C2⊂C1 is ε(C 1 /C 2 )-almost universal 2 extended code pair family. Furthermore, we can show the following theorem.
Theorem 6: For any t ≤ n and a code C 2 , there exists a t-dimensional code
This theorem can be shown in the same way as Theorem 5 by choosing C C as a universal 2 extended code family of C 2 . In later sections, we use these results for showing the existence of deterministic hash functions that work universally for classical and quantum wire-tap channels and for randomness extraction.
IV. APPLICATION TO ERROR CORRECTING CODES
In this section, as a preliminary for later section, we apply the results of Section II to error correction. We use a code C ∈ C chosen randomly from an ε-almost universal 2 code family C for error correction, and show that it indeed serves as a good code. As previous work, for example, Brassard and Salvail applied universal 2 codes in the context of information reconciliation (Ref. [3] , Theorem 6). Muramatsu and Miyake have also studied a similar problem using a somewhat generalized definition of universal hash functions [24] . Here we present a much simpler evaluation by employing a more restrictive condition for the ensemble of codes than [24] .
We consider a noisy channel with the additive noise, and denote the probability that the noise x ∈ F n 2 occurs by P X (x). We also denote byP X (k) the probability that an error with the Hamming weight k occurs. In this channel, the sender Alice uses an ε-almost universal 2 code family as error correcting codes. The receiver Bob applies to his message the maximum likelihood decoder. In order to evaluate its performance, we focus on the decoding error probability, with which the decoder makes a wrong guess. We denote the decoding error probability by P e (C) for a fixed code C. From now on, we often treat a code C as a random variable that is randomly chosen with the equal probability from the ε-almost universal 2 code family C. For example, we denote the expectation of variable A with respect to the random variable C as E C∈C A. In this notation, the main purpose of this section is to evaluate E C∈C P e (C), i.e., the average of P e (C) when C is randomly chosen from C.
First we consider the case where an ε-almost universal 2 code family C with maximum dimension t max is used. Hence the decoder outputs t max bits, and the coding rate is R = t max /n. If a bit flip error of k bits occurs in the channel, the average decoding error probability is less than min 2
. This is because the decoding error of the maximum likelihood decoder occurs when {x : |x| ≤ k} ∩ (C \ {0}) = ∅. For a given weight distributionP X (k) of errors, we obtain
As to the asymptotic behavior, one can easily see that, when the probabilityP X {k|1 − h (k/n) > R + δ} appoaches 1 for sufficientlt small δ > 0, the right hand side of (24) converges to zero.
However, for the cases of finite n, it is not easy to calculate similar bounds. Hence, next we further assume that the channel is memoryless; that is, the probability distribution P X of errors x is assumed to be the binary distribution with probability p. In this channel, the maximum-likelihood decoder is equivalent to the minimum Hamming distance decoder. In this case, by modifying Gallager's bound for the random coding [8] , we can obtain the following simple bound.
Theorem 7: When P X (x) is given as the n-th independent and identical distribution of the distribution (1 − p, p), then the average decoding error probability of error correction using an ε-almost universal 2 code family C with maximum dimension t max = nR satisfies
where
This theorem is shown in Appendix A. The function E 0 (s, p) defined in (26) is in fact the specialized form of Gallager's E 0 (s, p) for the binary symmetric channel and the uniform input distribution [8] . Hence by using the method of [8] , the right hand side of (25) can be used to evaluate the exponential decreasing rate of E C∈C P e (C) with respect to n as follows.
Corollary 2: Under the same conditions as Theorem 7, E C P e (C) can be bounded from above as
where E(R, p) is Gallager's reliability function
In particular, E(R, p) is strictly positive for R < 1 − h(p).
Proof of Corollary 2:
The first half of the corollary is obvious. Denote the argument of the maximum by E R (s, p) := −sR + E 0 (s, p). Then E R (0, p) = 0, and
. Hence E R (s, p) attains its positive maximum value at s ∈ (0, 1]. (Also see Ref. [8] .)
The exponential decreasing rate E(R, p) of (27) can also be verified from (24) by using the type method [7] . Sincê P X (k) ≤ 2 −nd(q p) with q = k/n for the binary symmetric channel [7] , the right hand side of (24) can be evaluated as
One can see that the exponential decreasing rate of (29) indeed equals E(R, p) by using the relation
The proof of this relation is given, e.g., in Csiszár-Körner [7] in a more general form. However, since a simpler proof of (30) can be given by using the property of additive channels, we reproduce it in Appendix B for readers' convenience. Now, we consider the case where the sender and the receiver use a fixed t-dimensional code C that satisfies the condition of Theorem 5, i.e., a code C whose permuted code family C C is (n + 1)-almost universal 2 . If the error distribution P X is permutation invariant, e.g., if the channel is binary symmetric, we have P e (C) = P e (σ(C)) for any permutation σ ∈ S n , which implies that P e (C) = E σ∈Sn P e (σ(C)). In other words, one may evaluate P e (C) as if the code family C C were actually used. Thus, by applying (25) and by noting n + 1 > 1, we obtain the inequality
with R = t/n. Note that the code C satisfies this inequalities for any p.
In the rest of this section, we show that the above results also hold for the case where the information is encoded by the coset C 1 /C 2 of two given codes C 1 and C 2 satisfying C 2 ⊂ C 1 ⊂ F n 2 . These codes are used for constructions of the quantum Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes, and for this reason, they are often called the classical CSS codes. In this section, we restrict ourselves to the following type of classical communication. A message to be sent is a coset [x] ∈ C 1 /C 2 , and when the sender wants to send [x], she chooses an element randomly from the set x + C 2 with the equal probability and sends it. On the receiver's side, Bob first applies the maximum likelihood decoder of C 1 on the received sequence and obtains an element y ∈ C 1 . Then, he obtains a coset [y] ∈ C 1 /C 2 as the final decoded message. We denote the decoding error probability of this decoder by P e (C 1 /C 2 ).
We assume that the subcode C 2 is fixed, and the larger code C 1 is randomly chosen with the equal probability from the ε-almost universal 2 extended code family C of C 2 with maximum dimension t max . Again, the purpose of the following discussion is to evaluate E C1∈C P e (C 1 /C 2 ). By a similar argument as above, when the bit flip error occurs on k bits in the noisy channel, we can show that
Thus, for any weight distributionP
X of errors, we have
If we further assume the channel is memoryless, as a generalization of Theorem 7 and Corollary 2, we have the following. Theorem 8: When P X (x) is given as the n-th independent and identical distribution of the distribution (1 − p, p), then an ε-almost universal 2 extended code family C of C 2 with the maximum dimension t max = nR satisfies
Similarly, ǫ-almost universal 2 extended code pair family {C 1,r ⊂ C 2,r } satisfies
This theorem is also shown in Appendix A in a way similar to Theorem 7. Finally, for a given code C 2 , we can choose another fixed code C 1 satisfying the condition of Theorem 6, i.e., C 2 ⊂ C 1 and ε(C 1 /C 2 ) ≤ n + 1. We then assume that the sender and the receiver use this fixed pair for error correction. If the distribution P X is permutation invariant, we have P e (C 1 /C 2 ) = P e (σ(C 1 )/σ(C 2 )) for any permutation σ ∈ S n , which implies that P e (C 1 /C 2 ) = E σ∈Sn P e (σ(C 1 )/σ(C 2 )). Thus one may evaluate P e (C 1 /C 2 ) as if the n + 1-almost universal 2 permuted code family C C2⊂C1 were actually used. Applying (33), we obtain the inequality
Note that the code C 1 satisfies this inequality for any p.
V. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
In this section, we apply the results of previous sections to the security proof of quantum key distribution (QKD). In QKD, Alice and Bob need to perform a key distillation protocol to generate a secret key from the sifted key that they obtained as a result of the quantum communication. We consider the following type of the BB84 protocol using a function family F = {f r : F m 2 → F l 2 |r ∈ I} for privacy amplification. BB84 protocol using universal hash function family:
1) Alice and Bob establish sifted keys, and estimate the bit error rate by the usual procedure of the BB84 protocol, such as the one given in [26] . That is, a) Alice sends Bob qubit states chosen randomly out of {|0 z , |1 z , |0 x , |1 x }. b) Bob receives and measures them with randomly chosen bases {z, x}. c) By using the authenticated public channel, Bob announces his measurement bases for all qubits, and they keep only the bits for which they chose the same basis. d) They reveal randomly sampled bits over the public channel, and calculate the estimated bit error rate.
If the rate is too high, they abort the protocol.
By using the widely used proof technique due to Shor and Preskill [26] , [10] , [29] , [14] , the unconditonal security of this protocol has been shown for the case where F consists of the completely random linear functions [29] , [14] . On the other hand, by using the quantum de Finneti representation theorem, Renner proved the unconditional security of the BB84 protocol using universal 2 hash functions for privacy amplification [25] . In this section, we present a security proof of the Shor-Preskill-type that holds with a weaker condition on F , i.e., with F being an ε-almost dual universal 2 family. Note that the condition on F is indeed relaxed, since, as shown in Sec. II, the universal 2 function family is a limited case of ε-almost dual universal 2 families.
Note also that our method has an extra advantage that, unlike in [25] , Alice and Bob do not need to perform random permutations of the sifted key bits. Conversely, if the random permutation is already implemented in one's QKD system, or if the channel is permutation invariant, our hash function can be replaced by the one using the deterministic code obtained in Theorem 6, since the permuted codes of this code form an (n + 1)-almost dual universal 2 code family.
For showing the security, it is convenient to rewrite the protocol in terms of the classical CSS code as follows.
BB84 protocol using code family C 2 : 1) Alice and Bob establish sifted keys k A , k B ∈ F n 2 by the same procedure as in the above protocol. 2) Alice picks R A ∈ C 1 randomly and sends v = k A ⊕ R A to Bob over the public channel. 3) Bob calculates R B = v ⊕ k B , and by correcting its errors using C 1 , he obtains R
with high probability.) 4) Alice selects code C 2r randomly and announces it to Bob. They both obtain secret keys as cosets of C 2r , i.e., S A = R A + C 2r , S B = R ′ B + C 2r . For the sake of simplicity, we will restrict ourselves to this protocol for the rest of this section. We begin by reviewing some of the known results and clarify notations. Assume that the quantum channel between Alice and Bob is given by an arbitrary quantum operation Λ, and thus the sifted key is affected by Λ. As discussed in [13] , [14] , since the above type of the BB84 protocol is invariant under twirling of qubits, without loss of generality, one may consider the Pauli channel Λ t obtained by twirling the original channel Λ. The Pauli channel Λ t can generally be described by the joint probability distribution P XZ of phase error and bit error (in this section, we call an error in the x basis the phase error, and in the z basis the bit error). That is, Λ t transforms an n-qubit state ρ to
with σ x and σ z being the Pauli matrices, and x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) ∈ {0, 1} n . We denote the marginal distribution of phase error by P X (x) = z∈F n 2 P XZ (x, z). As in the previous section,P X (k) denotes the distribution of the Hamming weight k of x obeying P X (x). Next, before considering the secret key, we evaluate the security of the sifted key v as an illustration. The result here will also be used in later sections on wire-tap channels and randomness extraction. Let ρ A,E be Alice's and Eve's total system when the when the first step of the protocol (i.e., the quantum communication part) is finished. If one employs the security criteria that takes into account the universal composability [25] , the security of the sifted key can be evaluated by Eve's distinguishability ρ A,E − ρ A ⊗ ρ E 1 , with ρ A := Tr E ρ A,E and ρ E := Tr A ρ A,E 2 . Alternatively, one may evaluate the security by Eve's Holevo information χ := Tr ρ A,E (log ρ A,E − log ρ A ⊗ ρ E ). These values are known to be bounded from above as [13] , [14] 
where P ph is the phase error probability of the channel Λ t . That is, P ph := 1 − P X (x = 0 n ). The function η n is defined as
Now we turn to the security of the secret key. The only difference here is that the key is effectively sent through the quantum channel that is error-corrected by the quantum CSS code corresponding to the classical CSS code C 1 , C 2 . Hence by using essentially the same argument as above, the security can be evaluated by the phase error probability that remains after the quantum error correction. When one sees it in the phase basis (i.e., the x basis), this probability is given by the decoding error probability of the classical CSS code C ⊥ 2 /C ⊥ 1 , which we denote by P ph C ⊥ 2 /C ⊥ 1 . Then the security of the secret key can be evaluated as
For the case of C 1 = F n 2 , essentially the same relation was noted by Koashi [19] and Miyadera [22] . Then we apply the results of the previous section to evaluate P ph C ⊥ 2 /C ⊥ 1 . In our BB84 protocol, the subcode C 2 ⊂ C 1 is randomly chosen from an ε-almost dual universal subcode family C with minimum dimension m − l of a fixed code C 1 . This corresponds to the case where the dual code C ⊥ 2 is chosen from the ε-almost universal 2 extended code family of the fixed code C ⊥ 1 with maximum dimension n − m + l. Thus by applying inequality (32), we have
where S = (m − l)/n is the sacrificed bit rate, i.e. the ratio of bits reduced by privacy amplification. Therefore, from (39), (40), and from the concavity of x → √ x, x → η l , we have
In practical QKD systems, the weight distributionP X needs to be estimated from the bit error rate of sampled bits (see, e.g., [13] , [14] ). If the phase error rate p ph = k/n is estimated to be less than a certain valuep ph with the exception of a negligiblly small probability, and if S > h(p ph ), then the argument ε2 −n[S−h(k/n)] + converges to zero for n → ∞. Asymptotically, it is sufficient to sacrifice n [h (p ph ) + δ] bits by privacy amplification with an arbitrary δ > 0.
From the above argument, we see that for the security of QKD, it is sufficient to choose the code C 2 from an ε-almost dual universal 2 subcode family of C 1 , while the existing results (e.g., [25] ) guarantee the security only when the code C 2 is randomly chosen from a universal 2 subcode family of C 1 . Since a universal 2 subcode family of C 1 is a 2-almost dual universal 2 subcode family of C 1 (Theorem 4), our condition is strictly weaker than that by [25] .
It should also be noted that by setting C 1 = F n 2 , our argument also applies to Koashi's proof technique [19] ; that is, random matrices appearing in Koashi's protocol can be replaced by an almost dual universal 2 code family. 2 Recall that, in our protocol, Alice is assumed to choose her sifted key uniformly. Hence ρ A,E can generally be described as ρ A,E := 
VI. QUANTUM WIRE-TAP CHANNEL
We apply our results of the previous section on QKD for showing the security in the quantum wire-tap channel model. In this model, the channel from Alice to Bob and the channel from Alice to Eve are both specified. Particularly, in this section, we assume that the channel from Alice to Bob is given by the n-multiple use of the Pauli channel which is described by the joint distribution P ZX of bit error and phase error on a single qubit system. We also assume that phase error and bit error occur independently, and denote the phase error probability by p ph . This corresponds to a limited case of the Pauli channel discussed in the previous section, i.e., P
As to the channel to Eve, we assume that Eve can access all part of the environment system corresponding to this channel.
Our goal is to show that Alice can send secret classical information via the quantum channel to Bob by the following coding protocol (c.f. the paragraph below (31)). First, Alice chooses a classical CSS code C 1 , C 2 . A message to be sent is a coset [x] ∈ C 1 /C 2 , and when the sender wants to send [x], she chooses an element randomly from the set x + C 2 with the equal probability and sends it. On the receiver's side, Bob first applies the maximum likelihood decoder of C 1 on the received bit sequence and obtains an element y ∈ C 1 . Then, he obtains a coset [y] ∈ C 1 /C 2 as the final decoded message.
From Eve's point of view, this protocol is equivalent to the situation where Alice sends her classical information [x] ∈ C 1 /C 2 by encoding it to a state |[x] of the quantum CSS code (see, e.g., [26] ). Hence we can evaluate the security of [x] by the same argument as the previous section, i.e., by inequality (42) or by (43), depending on one's security criteria. By noting that the channel between Alice and Bob is i.i.d., we can apply a simple bound given in Theorem 8. Thus, if a fixed a code C 1 , and an ε-almost dual universal 2 subcode family of C of C 1 are used, the average of
Here t min = n(1 − S) is the minimum dimension of C 2 , and t max = nS is the maximum dimension of C ⊥ 2 , which equals the sacrificed bit length. As one can see from Corollary 2, the exponential decreasing rate E (1 − S, p ph ) on the right hand side of (45) is strictly positive for S > h(p ph ). By using (45), the averages of Eve's distingushability ρ AE − ρ A ⊗ ρ E 1 and the Holevo information χ = Tr ρ AE (log ρ AE − log ρ A ⊗ ρ E ) can be evaluated as
with l = dim C 1 − t min being the length of message. In fact, it can be shown that this protocol is also secure even if Alice and Bob use a fixed pair of codes C 1 , C 2 . This is shown by noting that our setting is permutation invariant, and hence the above discussion can be extended to the permuted code pair family. As shown in Section III, given a code C 1 , we can choose another t-dimensional code C 2 such that C (43), we see that the security of C 1 , C 2 can be evaluated as
with the message length l = dim C 1 − t. Note that the construction of code C 2 is universal in that it does not depend on the value of p ph . Hence, the linear map defined by C 1 → C 1 /C 2 can be regarded as a type of deterministic universal hash function which is secure for an arbitrarily given quantum Pauli channel.
VII. CLASSICAL WIRE-TAP CHANNEL
A. Security criteria and upper bounds
Next we apply the above results to the classical wire-tap channel model, where all channels are classical. As in the previous section, we assume that the channels from Alice to Bob and the channel to Eve are both specified. However, we stress that, unlike in the previous section, general forms of these channels considered. That is, the main channel from Alice to Bob is described by a distribution
is the general probability distributions describing the outputs of Bob with Alice's input bit i = 0, 1. Similarly, the wire-tap channel from Alice to Eve is also given by the general distribution W E : i → W E i . For Alice's input of n bits, the outputs are given as n-multiple use of these channels as W
In these channels, Alice and Bob perform the same protocol as the previous section to convey a secret bit string. Alice's message is a coset [x] ∈ C 1 /C 2 of a classical CSS code C 1 , C 2 , and Bob decodes it using the maximum likelihood decoder. If one uses the universally composable security criteria, Eve's distingushability can be evaluated by the L 1 distance (variational distance) of the classical distribution, defined by 1
Here, for a given subset Y ⊂ F Alternatively, if one uses the security criteria based on the mutual information between Alice and Eve, it can be written as
.
(51)
In particular, a protocol on the wire-tap channel is said to have the strong (resp., weak) security when the mutual information I(A n : E n ) (resp., 1 n I(A n : E n )) converges to zero as n → ∞ (see, e.g., [21] ). We evaluate these quantities by using the results of the previous section. We do this by simulating our classical channels by the quantum Pauli channel, i.e., we consider a quantum channel obtained by the purification of our classical channel. In order to see that it is indeed possible, first denote by H E Eve's original system describing the classical channel W E i , where she receives a state e W E i (e)|e e| as a result of Alice's input i. Then, by choosing another environment system H R suitably, one can construct pure states ρ 0,E and ρ 1,E on the extended system H E ⊗ H R such that Tr HR ρ i,E = e W E i (e)|e e| and the fidelity between ρ 0,E and ρ 1,E equals the fidelity F between the two distributions W E 0 , W E 1 on Eve's side. That is,
Without loss of security, we may assume that Eve can not only access to H E , but also to the larger system H E ⊗ H R , since it can only increase Eve's information. Similarly, we may also assume that she can perform any quantum measurement in H E ⊗ H R . Then the situation is the same as that of the quantum wire-tap channel discussed in the previous section, and thus the L 1 distance (50) can be bounded from above by that of the quantum case, ρ A,ER − ρ A ⊗ ρ ER 1 , where
By a similar argument, the mutual information (51) can also be bounded from above by the quantum mutual information
We advance our analysis further by restricting ourselves to a specific type of the Pauli channel Λ t where bit error and phase error occur independently. Recall that this type of the channel was also discussed in the previous section. For each bit, the channel Λ t between Alice and Bob can be described by Stinespring representation using Eve's state |ψ and a unitary operator V as
If this channel simulates Eve's extended channel, we have
where |i A is the qubit state corresponding to Alice's input i. Since Eve's states ρ i,ER in the extended space H E ⊗ H R are pure states, they can be represented with a suitable choice of the basis |0 ER , |1 ER as
with
and p ph = p X (1). (See, also, Section VII of [13] .) By noting that the fidelity between |ϕ 0 ER and |ϕ 1 ER is 1 − 2p ph , and from (52), we have p ph = 1−F 2 . Hence we have shown that Eve's classical channel W E i with the fidelity F can be simulated by the environment of the above Pauli channel with the phase error probability p ph = 1−F 2 . The secrecy in the n-mutiple use of the channel, i.e., in the presence of Eve's channel W E n , can also be evaluated by the n-mutiple use of this Pauli channel. Therefore, by using (46) and (47), the averages of Eve's distingushability and the mutual information between Alice and Eve I C1/C2 (A n : E n ) are evaluated as follows.
Theorem 9:
Consider the classical wiretap channel model defined at the beginning of this section. If Alice and Bob choose C 2 from an ε-almost dual universal 2 subcode family C of C 1 , the secrecy of message [x] ∈ C 1 /C 2 is given by
where p ph := 1−F 2 , and F := e W E 0 (e) W E 1 (e) is the fidelity between Eve's probability distributions W E 0 and W E 1 corresponding to Alice's input i = 0, 1. The parameter t min = Sn is the minimum dimension of C 2 , which equals the length of the sacrificed bits. The length of message [x] is given by l := dim C 1 − t min . As one can see from Corollary 2, if the sacrifice bit rate S := t min /n is greater than h
1−F 2
, the decreasing rate E(1−S, p ph ) is strictly positive, and thus the strong security is guaranteed. Furthermore, employing the same idea as Hayashi [16] , we can apply this result to secret key agreement (distillation) even in the classical setting.
As in the case of the quantum wire-tap channel, we can show that our protocol is secure even if Alice and Bob use a fixed pair of codes C 1 , C 2 .
Corollary 3: Consider the same setting as Theorem 9 except that, instead of C 1 and a code family C, Alice and Bob use a fixed pair of codes codes C 1 , C 2 satisfying the condition of Theorem 6. Then the secrecy of [x] is given by 1
with message length l = dim
Proof: This is again proved by using the permutation invariance of the channel, i.e., by extending the discussion of Theorem 9 to the permuted code pair family. As shown in Theorem 6, given a code C 1 , one can choose another code C 2 such that C
Then by a similar argument with (48) and (49), we obtain (59) and (60). Note that the construction of the code C 2 does not depend on the fidelity F , or on the form of the channel to Eve. So, the hash function C 1 → C 1 /C 2 can be regarded as a deterministic universal hash function in this classical setting as well.
Also, it should be noted that the above discussion can be applied to the general quantum case. That is, when Eve's output state is given as W i for Alice's input i = 0, 1, the same result holds with
B. Comparison with existing results
In order to compare our results of this section with existing ones, we here review the history of the studies of the wire-tap channel. For a sacrifice bit rate R greater than the mutual information I(A : E) between Alice and Eve, Wyner [32] , and Csiszár and Körner [6] showed the weak security in terms of Maurer and Wolf [21] . Csiszár [5] showed the strong security with the same sacrifice bit rate in terms of Maurer and Wolf [21] . Hayashi [12] gave the concrete exponential decreasing rate for the strong security with the same sacrifice bit rate. These studies use completely random coding as privacy amplification process. That is, no linear functions are used in this process. Bennett et al. [2] proposed to use universal 2 hash functions for privacy amplification. Maurer and Wolf [21] applied this idea to the secret key agreement, which is different setting form wiretap channel. They showed the strong security with universal 2 hash functions for privacy amplification. Based on these ideas, Hayashi [16] showed the strong security with universal 2 hash functions when the sacrifice bit rate is greater than the mutual information I(A : E). Muramatsu and Miyake [23] considered a more general condition [24] than the ε-almost universal 2 functions of the code for privacy amplification. Under this condition, they showed the weak security with the same sacrifice bit rate. However, Watanabe et al. [30] pointed out that their method cannot derive the strong security based on Hayashi's idea [15] in the case of secret key agreement from correlated source.
Hence, the existing results can be summarized as follows. Suppose that the sacrifice bit rate S is greater than the mutual information I(A :
, with H(P ) being the Shannon entropy of the distribution P . Then, (i) The strong security holds if the code C 2 is chosen from a universal 2 subcode family of C 1 [12] .
(ii) The weak security holds if the code C 2 is chosen from an ε-almost universal 2 subcode family of C 1 [23] , but the strong security is not necessarily guaranteed, because of the counterexample we give in Theorem 10. On the other hand, our results of this section can be summarized as follows: (a) An ε-almost dual universal 2 subcode family of C 1 can guarantee the strong security when the asymptotic sacrifice bit rate S is greater than h(
There exists a deterministic universal hash function that guarantees the strong security when S is greater than h(
The construction of this hash function does not depend on the form of the channel to Eve.
In comparison with the existing results, the advantage of our (b) is clear; all existing hash functions are constructed randomly. Note that it is indeed possible to construct a deterministic function from a set of randomized functions by choosing the best one, but the deterministic function thus obtained generally depends on the form of the channel to Eve.
The advantage of our method (a) needs a more complicated explanation. In comparison with (i), method (a) has a advantage that it can guarantee the strong security with a weaker condition on code C ⊥ 2 . Indeed, as we have shown in Theorem 3, the ε-almost dual universality 2 of (a) is strictly weaker than the universality 2 of (i). In comparison with (ii), however, it is not clear whether our condition on C 2 is weaker or stronger. Rather, the advantage of (a) against (ii) is that (a) can achieve the strong security, while (ii) can only achieve the weak security. The impossibility of the strong security under the condition of (ii) will be shown in Theorem 10 by giving a counterexample.
On the other hand, the disadvantage of our method is the required asymptotic sacrifice bit rate h(
1−F
2 ), which is larger than that of the existing methods, H
The fact that our rate is indeed larger can be shown by the information processing inequality concerning the quantum relative entropy for the TP-CP map ρ → Tr HR ρ. More specifically, if we compare the rates for the case where Eve's channel is a binary symmetric channel with error probability p, our required sacrifice bit rate is h 1 2 − p(1 − p) , while that of the existing methods is 1 − h(p). As we have plotted in Fig. 2 , the difference of the two rates is relatively small for small p. This means that our method is particularly effective for small p, under the assumption that an ε-almost dual universal 2 subcode family C of C 1 can be implemented with a relatively small amount of calculation. − p(1 − p) of our method using an ε-almost dual universal 2 subcode family (the present paper). Lower line : 1 − h(p) of the existing method using a universal 2 subcode family (previous papers [32] , [6] , [5] , [12] , [16] , [23] ).
C. ε-almost dual universality 2 vs. ε-almost universality 2 Finally, as mentioned earlier, we present an example of the classical wire-tap channel model that can vividly contrast the properties of the ε-almost dual universality 2 and the ε-almost universality 2 . In this example one sees that, if ε ≥ 2, an ε-almost universal 2 subcode family (of C 1 = F n 2 ) cannot necessarily guarantee the strong security. In other words, the choice of the code C 2 from an ε-almost universal 2 subcode family of C 1 is not sufficient for the strong security. Note that we have shown in this section that the ε-almost dual universality 2 is indeed sufficient for this purpose. Hence, at least in the setting of this section, the ε-almost dual universality 2 is the more relevant criterion for security.
Theorem 10: Assume that the channel from Alice to Bob is noiseless, and the channel to Eve is binary symmetric with error probability p. There exists an example of a 2-almost universal 2 code family C for which the hash functions (i.e., F n 2 → F n 2 /C 2 with C 2 ∈ C) cannot guarantee the strong security.
Proof: Choose an arbitrary universal 2 code family
Here, a b denotes the concatenation of a and b. Hence for any C 2 ∈ C, there exists C ′ 2 ∈ C ′ , such that C 2 consists of x ∈ C ′ 2 concatenated with a zero. Note that the code family C is obviously 2-almost universal 2 , but its dual code family C ⊥ cannot be ε-almost universal 2 for any ε < 1, because x = 0 . . . 01 ∈ C for all C ∈ C ⊥ . When Alice transmits a coset [x] ∈ F n 2 /C 2 as her secret message, she chooses x ∈ [x] randomly and sends it to Bob. Due to our construction of C, the n-th bit of x is preserved in [x] as it is without being canceled by privacy amplification. Since Eve receives this n-th bit with the error probability p, Eve's mutual information regarding [x] is greater than 1 − h(p). Therefore, the strong security does not hold with these hash functions.
VIII. APPLICATION TO RANDOMNESS EXTRACTION
The results of the previous section can be applied for showing the security of classical randomness extraction. The goal of the randomness extraction model is to extract, from a given source A, a longest random string possible which obeys uniform distribution.
In this section, we consider the n-th i.i.d. source A n of a general binary source A. In order to extract randomness from A n , Alice performs privacy amplification by the linear map F n 2 → F n 2 /C. That is, on receiving a sequence x ∈ F n 2 from A n , she randomly chooses a code C from a code family C, and calculates the corresponding secret bits as a coset [x] ∈ F n 2 /C. The security of the secrecy of [x] can be evaluated as follows. As one can see from the proof below, we obtain these inequalities by reducing the problem to the wire-tap channel of the previous section.
Theorem 11: Let A n be the n-th independent and identically distributed sources of a general binary distribution A, given by (P A (0),
Also let U A n C denote the uniform distribution in F 2 /C. Under these conditions, if C is randomly chosen from an ε-almost dual universal code family C with minimum dimension t min , the secrecy of [x] can be evaluated as
The minimum dimension t min equals the bit length reduced by the hash function. Thus the length of a random number is l = n − t min , and the generation rate of the extractor R = 1 − t min /n.
Proof: We prove this theorem by reducing the problem to the wire-tap channel model. For this purpose, we introduce fictitious Eve who is correlated with Alice by the joint distribution Q
n is the n-th identical and independent distribution of Q AE given by
n (y|x) can be regarded as defining the additive channel from Alice to Eve. Also note that the marginal distributions of Alice and of Eve are uniform; Q A n (x) = Q E n (y) = 2 −n for ∀x, y. This setting can be considered as a special case of the classical wire-tap channel where there is no error between Alice and Bob. In this case, the bit error correction is not necessary and we may take C 1 = F n 2 . As to the phase error, from (52) and (61), the fidelity between W E 0 and W E 1 is F = 2 p(1 − p). Hence Eve's channel can be simulated by the phase error probability
In fact, due to the additivity of the channel, we have a more general relation, P
n (x, y) for ∀x, y. Thus, by noting the linearity of the hash function, we
for arbitrary [x] ∈ F n 2 /C and y ∈ F n 2 . By using (62), the variational distance P
can be rewritten as
(y) of the previous section, which is the probability that Eve receives y under the condition that Alice's message is [x] , takes the form W
n (z, y). Then the above variational distance can be rewritten further as
where U E n is the uniform distribution over F n 2 . Then by averaging P
over codes C ∈ C, and applying Theorem 9, the variational distance between the randomness extractor and the true uniform distribution can be evaluated as
By a similar argument, this randomness can also be evaluated in terms of divergence as
Furthermore, since our setting is permutation invariant as in the previous two sections, we can show that the secrecy can be guaranteed by using a fixed code C.
Corollary 4: Under the same conditions as Theorem 11, and for a fixed t-dimensional code C satisfying the condition of Theorem 5, the randomness extractor
Note that the construction of C does not depend on the value of p ph . Hence the hash function F n 2 → F n 2 /C using this fixed code C can be regarded as a deterministic universal hash function for randomness extraction. By using this function, both P
converge to zero exponentially, when the asymptotic random number generation rate R is smaller than 1 − h 1/2 − p(1 − p) . On the other hand, the asymptotic rate of conventional hash functions is the min-entropy rate − log(1 − p) obtained, e.g., in [18] . Since
as shown in Appendix C, our hash function indeed achieves a better asymptotic generation rate. This fact is also illustrated in Fig. 3 . − p(1 − p) of the present paper. The lower line (dashed line) − log(1 − p) using conventional method [18] .
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first established the one-to-one correspondence between a function family F and a code family C. Then we showed that the universality of C restricts that of C ⊥ , and by using this fact, introduced a new class of universal code family called an ε-almost dual universal 2 code family, which is indeed a generalization of a universal 2 code family. We also presented applications of this concept to several communication models, namely, error correction, quantum key distribution, the quantum wire-tap channel, and the classical wire-tap channel.
For example, as to quantum key distribution, we proved the security of the BB84 protocol using ε-almost dual universal 2 functions for privacy amplification, by using the Shor-Preskill-type proof technique.
In the context of the wire-tap channel, in Section VII, we have shown the strong security for the classical wire-tap channel when the subcode C 2 for privacy amplification is chosen from ε-almost dual universal 2 subcode family of C 1 . We have also succeeded in showing the existence of a deterministic hash function that does not depends on the form of Eve's channel and achieves the strong security. However, our method has a disadvantage that it requires that the sacrifice bit rate S is greater than the value h( 1−F 2 ) with F := e W E 0 (e) W E 1 (e). This rate is larger than the mutual information I(A : E) between Alice and Eve. Hence, it is an open problem whether the strong security holds when the sacrifice bit rate S is greater than Eve's mutual information I(A : E), and the subcode C 2 for privacy amplification is chosen from ε-almost dual universal 2 subcode family of C 1 .
Similarly, we have shown that an ε-almost dual universal 2 code family can be used for randomness extraction. Combining this fact and the model's invariance under bit permutations, we have constructed a deterministic hash function that is secure against a binary distribution with an arbitrary probability p. Since its construction does not depends on the parameter p, it is indeed a "universal" hash function. The generation rate of the presented method is larger than the minimum entropy, which is the generation rate of the conventional method [18] .
Finally, we explain the relation of our results to a universal quantum CSS code found by Hamada [11] for sending quantum states. In his paper, he focused on an ensemble of classical self-dual codes. Then combining qubits based on the bit basis and qubits based on the phase basis, he succeeded in constructing a universal quantum CSS code from a set of universal classical self-dual codes by choosing C ⊥ 1 = C 2 . His code can be applied to QKD, where Alice can send information by using both of the bit basis and the phase basis. On the other hand, it cannot be applied to our quantum wire-tap channel model in a straightforward manner, where only the bit basis is used for sending the classical message. This is because our method employs two codes C 1 and C 2 chosen separately. Our method for constructing a deterministic universal hash function would not work either, if we were to restrict our codes to self-dual codes. Recall that the key point of our method is the concept of a "permuted code pair family." APPENDIX A PROOFS OF THEOREMS 7 AND 8
First, we show Theorem 7. Due to the linearity, it is sufficient to evaluate the probability that the received signal is erroneously decoded to C \ {0} when 0 ∈ C is sent. Let P n X (x) be the n-independent and identical extension of the distribution (1 − p, p) . Since the phase error x occurs on n-bits sequence with the probability P n X (x), applying Gallager's evaluation [8] to this error probability, for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ a = Thus, the error probability P (C) is bounded from above by this value. Any ε-almost universal 2 code family satisfies the inequality E C∈C x∈C\{0} P n X (y + x) 
where the concavity of x → x s is used. Since the quantity ε2 
From this, we obtain Theorem 7. Next, we show Theorem 8. Due to the linearity, it is sufficient to evaluate the probability that the received signal is erroneously decoded to C 1 \ C 2 when Alice sends 0 ∈ C 2 . The difference from the above case is the derivation of (64). This part of derivation can be replaced as follows. Combining this and (65), we obtain Theorem 8. Replacing C 1 and C 2 by C 1,r and C 2,r in the derivation, we obtain the evaluations (35) and (36) for E C1,r⊂C2,r P e (C 1,r /C 2,r ).
APPENDIX B PROOF OF EQUATION (30)
In order to prove this equation, it is convenient to introduce another binary distribution P θ = (p θ , 1 − p θ ) that is derived from P = (p, 1 − p), where p θ is defined by
with the convention that p 0 = 0 if p = 0. The distribution P θ , parameterized by a real number θ ≥ 0, is often called the exponential family of P . We also define a function ψ(θ) by ψ(θ) := log p θ + (1 − p) θ .
Then the following relations are useful for simplifying calculations of divergence d(p q) and entropy h(p). For θ ≥ 0, we have
We shall make frequent use of these formulas in what follows. Note that E 0 (s, p) can be rewritten as
First, we prove Equation (30) for the limited case where the minimum is evaluated over q = p θ with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
Proof: E R (s, p) = −sR + E 0 (s, p) is convex with respect to s, since E ′′ R (s, p) = (1 + s) −3 ψ ′′ (1/(1 + s)) ≥ 0. We define the critical rate R c by R c := 1 − h p 1/2 , such that, if R ≤ R c (resp., R ≥ R c ), then ∂ER ∂s s=1
≥ 0 (resp., 
Hence E(R, p) = E R (s R , p) = −ψ
Note that the condition (67) can also be written as 1 − h p (1+sR) −1 − R = 0. Then by noting that d(p θ p) − h(p θ ) is monotonically increasing for 1/2 ≤ θ ≤ 1, whereas d(p θ p) decreasing, we see that the minimum of (66) is attained for θ = (1 + s R ) −1 . Hence (66) holds for R > R c as well.
